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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature

Of The Case
Shunn appeals from

Forrest Glenn

his sentences for grand theft

Statement

Of The

Facts

amended judgment reducing

and possession of methamphetamine.

And Course Of The Proceedings

Shunn entered a shop and
(46773 R., pp.

the district court’s

17, 22-25.)

The

stole

state

power

tools, a heater

and a

light

valued

at $1,680.

charged Shunn With burglary With a persistent Violator

enhancement. (46773 R., pp. 44-45.) Pursuant to a plea agreement he pled guilty to one
count of grand theft and having violated a probation imposed in two previous cases
(possession ofmethamphetamine and burglary). (46773 R., pp. 46-51, 58-59.)

The

district

court imposed a sentence of 10 years with three years determinate to run consecutive t0 the

previously imposed sentences for possession of methamphetamine and burglary, and

suspended the sentences and ordered probation. (46773 R., pp. 56-60.)
Three months

later police

found Shunn in possession 0f methamphetamine and

paraphernalia during a probation search. (46774 R., p. 10.) The state charged Shunn with

possession 0f methamphetamine, With a persistent Violator enhancement, and possession

0f paraphernalia.

(46774 R., pp.

methamphetamine pursuant
probation.

t0 a plea

32-34.)

Shunn pled

agreement With the

(46774 R., pp. 35-37.) The

district court

state

possession

of

and admitted Violating

his

guilty

to

imposed a sentence 0f seven years

with one year determinate, consecutive to previously imposed sentences. (46774 R., pp.
47-50.)

The

district court also

revoked Shunn’s probations related to his three immediately

prior felony convictions. (46773 R., pp. 79-82.)

The
t0

district court later

reduced the older possession 0f methamphetamine sentence

seven years with one year determinate, and reduced the grand theft sentence t0 ten years

With two years determinate. (46774 R., pp. 61-63; 46773 R., pp. 93-96.) Shunn mailed a
notice of appeal 49 days after entry

judgment reducing

his sentences.

ofjudgment and 22 days

after entry

of the amended

(46774 R., pp. 66-73; 46773 R., pp. 98-101.)

ISSUES
Shunn
I.

II.

states the issues

0n appeal

as:

Did the district court abuse its discretion When it sentenced Mr.
Shunn in the 2018 case t0 a uniﬁed term of seven years, with one
year ﬁxed, to be served consecutively to the sentences imposed in
the 2014, 2015, and 2017 cases?
Did the district court abuse its discretion in failing to treat the letters
Mr. Shunn sent to the court as a pro se Idaho Criminal Rule 35
motion for reduction 0f sentence, and

in failing to consider the

additional information contained in those letters?

(Appellant’s brief, p. 4.)

The
1.

state rephrases the issues as:

Because Shunn’s appeal is timely only from the amended judgments reducing his
sentences, may he only challenge the district court’s decision t0 not reduce the
sentences further?

2.

Regardless 0f this court’s jurisdiction, has Shunn failed t0 show that the sentences

imposed and

as reduced

by the

district court

were excessive?

ARGUMENT
I.

Shunn’s Appeal
A.

Timely Only From The Amended Judgments Reducing His Sentences

Introduction

The

district

R., pp. 47-50.)

46774

Is

entered judgment 0n September 4, 2018. (46773 R., pp. 79-82; 46774

Shunn mailed his notice of appeal on October 23, 2018. (46773

R., p.69.)

Because Shunn did not mail

ofthe original judgment,

this

appeal

is

his notice

0f appeal

until

49 days

R., p. 101 ;

after entry

not timely from the original judgment and this Court

lacks jurisdiction to consider any appellate challenge to that judgment.

B.

Standard

Of Review

“‘A question ofjurisdiction
[the appellate courts’] attention

an appeal.’” State

V.

is

fundamental;

it

when brought

t0

to considering the merits

of

cannot be ignored

and should be addressed prior

Kavajecz, 139 Idaho 482, 483, 80 P.3d 1083, 1084 (2003) (quoting

H & V Engineering, Inc. V. Idaho State Bd. 0f Professional Engineers and Land Surveyors,
113 Idaho 646, 648, 747 P.2d 55, 57 (1987)). Whether a court has jurisdiction

0f law, given free review. Kavajecz, 139 Idaho

C.

Shunn’s Untimely Notice
Consider

An

AnV Challenge T0 The

appeal from the district court

483, 80 P.3d

Confers

No

at

is

a question

1084.

Jurisdiction For This Court

To

Original Judgment

“may be made only by physically

within 42 days” of an appealable order. I.A.R. 14(a).

0f appeal
of appeal

Of Appeal

at

is

a prerequisite to appellate jurisdiction.

ﬁling a notice

A timely ﬁled notice

I.A.R. 21; State V. Payan, 128 Idaho

866, 920 P.2d 82 (Ct. App. 1996); State V. Fuller, 104 Idaho 891, 665 P.2d 190 (Ct. App.

1983).

The

failure t0 ﬁle a notice

of appeal Within the time limits prescribed by the

appellate rules requires “automatic dismissal” of the appeal.

TLlccr, 103 Idaho 885, 888, 655 P.2d 92, 95 (1982).
inmate’s documents are
for the purpose

deemed ﬁled as 0f the

I.A.R. 21;

Under

ﬂ alﬂ

m

the “mailbox rule,” a pro se

date they are submitted to prison authorities

0f mailing them to the court for ﬁling. Munson

V. State,

128 Idaho 639,

642, 917 P.2d 796, 799 (1996).
Therefore, Where a notice of appeal

0n appeal
813

(Ct.

are

conﬁned

App. 1983);

to that order.

ﬂ

is

timely only from a particular order, the issues

State V. Dryden, 105 Idaho 848, 852, 673 P.2d 809,

also State V. Russell, 122 Idaho 488,

489

n.1,

n.1 (1992) (no appellate jurisdiction to consider original ﬁnal

where appeal was only timely

835 P.2d 1299, 1300

judgment 0f conviction

to challenge probation revocation); State V. Jensen, 138

Idaho 941, 943-944, 71 P.3d 1088, 1090-1091 (Ct. App. 2003) (n0 appellate jurisdiction to
consider defendant’s claim 0f double jeopardy Where defendant’s notice 0f appeal

was only

timely as to the order revoking his probation); Tucker, 103 Idaho at 888, 655 P.2d at 95
(no appellate jurisdiction t0 entertain the question of Whether the district court could
lawfully enhance defendant’s sentence Where the notice of appeal

was ﬁled

after the order

revoking probation was entered and more than one year from the date of the original
sentence).

As

set forth

above, Shunn’s notice 0f appeal was presented t0 prison authorities for

ﬁling with the court more than 42 days after entry of the

days from entry of the amended judgment.

It is

settled

initial

law

judgment but

that entry

less than

42

of an amended ﬁnal

order does not necessarily “extend the period for ﬁling an appeal or begin that period

anew.”

m,

128 Idaho

at 867,

as to matters actually altered

920 P.2d

by

the

at 83.

Rather,

it

makes an appeal timely only

amendment; the appellate court does not have

jurisdiction t0 address matters unaffected

m,

the

amendments

to the order.

m

150 Idaho 305, 308, 246 P.3d 958, 961 (2010) (“When an amended judgment

alters content other

than the material terms from which a party

not serve to enlarge the time for appeal”);

this

by

m,

128 Idaho

may

at 867,

appeal,

its

920 P.2d

entry does

at 83.

Court has jurisdiction t0 consider challenges only t0 the changes made by the

court in the

amended judgment. This Court

Thus,
district

lacks jurisdiction t0 consider Shunn’s claims

0f error related to the original sentencing and entry of the original judgment. (Appellant’s
brief, pp. 5-8.)

II.

Shunn Has Failed To Show That The Sentences Reduced BV The

District

Court Were

Excessive

A.

Introduction

After entering judgment, the district court reduced the 2014 possession 0f

methamphetamine sentence

to

seven years With one year determinate, and reduced the

grand theft sentence to ten with two years determinate. (46773 R., pp. 87-89, 93-96; 46774
R., pp. 55-57, 61-63.)

It

did so “sua sponte, using

noting n0 I.C.R. 35 motion has been ﬁled

(46773 R.,

p. 94;

46774

R., p. 62.)

its

own

by counsel

discretion under I.C.R. 35, and

for

FORREST GLEN SHUNN.”

Shunn ﬁled a notice of appeal timely from the entry of

the order granting a reduction of sentence. (46773 R., pp. 98-101;

On

46774

appeal Shunn contends the district court erred by not considering his hand-

written letters (46773 R., pp. 83-86, 90-92, 96-97;

46774

R., pp. 51-54, 58-60, 64-65) as a

Rule 35 motion and granting him a further reduced sentence. (Appellant’s

Shunn has

R., pp. 66-73.)

failed t0

show an abuse 0f discretion.

brief, pp. 8-1 1.)

B.

Standard

Of Review

“A motion

for reduction

0f sentence under I.C.R. 35

leniency, addressed t0 the sound discretion 0f the court.”

513, 517, 415 P.3d 381, 385 (Ct. App. 2015).

defendant must show that the sentence
subsequently provided t0 the

is

160 Idaho 177, 180, 369 P.3d 955, 958

(Ct.

essentially a plea for

State V. Anderson, 163 Idaho

“In presenting an I.C.R. 35 motion, the

excessive in light

district court in

is

ofnew or additional information

support 0f the motion.”

App. 2016)

(citing State V.

State V. Burggraf,

Huffman, 144 Idaho

201, 203, 159 P.3d 838, 840 (2007)).

C.

Shunn Has Shown No Abuse Of Discretion

T0 show an abuse 0f discretion, Shunn must demonstrate

that the district court did

not “correctly perceive[] the issue as one of discretion,” did not act “within the outer

boundaries of its discretion,” did not act “consistently With the legal standards applicable
t0 the speciﬁc choices available t0 it” or did not reach its decision

reason.”

Lunneborg

Review 0f the

V.

MV

Fun

record, however,

Life, 163 Idaho 856, 863,

shows

that

none of these

“by the exercise 0f

421 P.3d 187, 194 (2018).

factors apply in this case.

The district court initially sentenced Shunn to ten years with three years determinate
for grand theft

and seven years with three years determinate for the 2014 possession of

methamphetamine conviction, consecutive

to

each other and the prior burglary and

possession 0f methamphetamine convictions, for cumulative sentences on
convictions of 25 years with eight years determinate.

because “a

lot

all

new

four felony

(46774 R., pp. 47-50.)

It

did so

of resources” had been employed for Shunn’s rehabilitation, and there

wasn’t “anything more to d0” 0n community release.

(TL, p. 33, Ls. 5-8.)

court recognized the latest possession of a controlled substance

The

district

was “not all that concerning

from a public safety standpoint” but Shunn’s “prior offenses” were concerning because
they “hurt other people” and Shunn had “been consistently

at

it

for quite

some

time.”

(T12,

p. 33, Ls. 7-11.)

The
record

district court’s analysis is

starts in

amply supported by

the record.

Shunn’s criminal

1992 and includes seven felony and two misdemeanor theft-related or

burglary convictions, one escape felony conviction, and two felony controlled substance
(PSI, pp. 1-2, 7-13 (page citations to conﬁdential exhibits electronic ﬁle).)

convictions.

He was

placed in mental health court in 2015 as a result 0f convictions for burglary and

possession of a controlled substance. (PSI, pp. 2, 12-13.)

on probation

in 2016. (PSI, p. 2.) In

He

violated but

2017 he violated again and the

probation and retained jurisdiction. (PSI, p.

2.)

was continued

district court

revoked

Despite Shunn’s poor record of following

prison rules during the retained jurisdiction, the district court placed him back on probation.

(PSI, p. 2.)

As

set forth

above, he violated this probation by committing a grand

theft,

was

placed back 0n probation, and violated again by possessing methamphetamine and
paraphernalia. (Supra, pp. 1-2.) This initial sentencing decision

appellate jurisdiction, but

its

reasonableness

is

is

not Within this Court’s

demonstrated by the record.

After sentencing, the district court then reduced two of the sentences
the

ﬁxed portion from

to

two (grand

t0

make Shunn parole

as

opposed

The

three t0 one (possession of a controlled substance) and

theft), respectively.

t0 the

by reducing
from three

(46774 R., pp. 61-63.) The effect 0f this reduction was

eligible (after credit for time served) in

“approximately 2.6 years

approximate 5.4 years” as in the original sentences. (46774 R.,

district court’s

decision to not further reduce the sentences

was reasonable.

p. 63.)

Shunn argues
as a

that the district court erred

Rule 35 motion and therefore abused

When

therein

its

by not treating

a letter he sent to the court

by not considering information

discretion

(Appellant’s brief, pp. 8-1

deciding t0 reduce the sentences.

1.)

This

argument does not withstand analysis.

A district court may treat a defendant’s letter as a motion. E, gg, State V. Torres,
107 Idaho 895, 897, 693 P.2d 1097, 1099

(Ct.

App. 1984). In

m

the district judge a letter speciﬁcally requesting a ‘Rule 35 Sentence

the time limits of I.C.R. 35.

Li.

motion outside of those time

the defendant “sent

Reduction” within

Torres” counsel subsequently ﬁled an

limits.

The

I_d.

argued that the

state

“cognizable” as a Rule 35 motion and therefore the

amended Rule 35

district court

letter

was not

lacked jurisdiction to

consider the requested reduction in sentence. Li. Rej ecting that argument, the Idaho Court

of Appeals held that “the

district judge

did not err

by treating

Torres’ letter as a motion for

reduction 0f sentence under the Idaho Rule.” Li. The applicable legal standard

letter t0

a

trial

court from a defendant can be treated as

m, 139 Idaho

some type 0f motion.”

m

is

that “a

957, 960, 88 P.3d 776, 779 (Ct. App. 2003) (emphasis added).

In this case the district court stated

it

was “using

its

own

discretion under I.C.R.

35” and speciﬁcally noted “no I.C.R. 35 motion has been ﬁled by counsel.” (46774 R.,
56 (emphasis added).) Nothing in the

district court’s

to the district court four days previously.

the court before

Which had not been

been forwarded

t0 counsel.

order addressed the letter Shunn sent

(46774 R., pp. 51-57.) Shunn had sent

treated as motions

(46774 R.,

p. 4;

ﬂ alﬂ

and

46774

at least

letter sent

one

letter

letters sent

letters to

had simply

R., p. 61-63 (letter

day as order reducing sentence); Conf. Doc., pp. 1-23 (additional

The

p.

ﬁled same

by Shunn).)

Within 14 days 0f the judgment terminating probation bears n0 caption 0r

other designation as a motion.

discretion

by not

treating the letter as a

letters as a

district court

did not abuse

its

Rule 35 motion.

the district court “abused

Shunn contends
Shunn’s

The

(46774 R., p.51.)

discretion in failing to treat Mr.

its

pro se Rule 35 motion, and in failing t0 consider the ‘fresh information’

Mr. Shunn provided

t0 the court in support

(Appellant’s brief, p. 11.) First,

of his request for a reduction 0f his sentences.”

Shunn claims

the district court abused

its

discretion

by not

considering the letter a motion because in the letter Shunn asks for retained jurisdiction

and

asserts

pp. 8-1

1;

he can present additional argument

ﬂ

46674

R., pp. 51-52.)

at a

Rule 35 hearing. (Appellant’s

However, he has

show

failed to

brief,

legally or factually

why

a statement of preference for retained jurisdiction and an off—hand reference to Rule

35

sufﬁcient to remove the court’s discretion t0 consider What

is

letter,

and not a motion. The contents of the

district court

abused

its

discretion

Second, because the

letter

the district court did not abuse

letter.

The

district court

its

by not

letter

was not a motion, and

was not required

facially a letter to

alone are insufﬁcient t0

treating the letter as a

discretion

is

show

be a

that the

Rule 35 motion.

therefore

n0 motion was pending,

by not “consider[ing]”

the information in the

to “consider” information submitted in a letter

Without a pending motion.

Even more

basically,

however, the record does not establish that the

did not “consider” the information in the

letter.

The

district court’s

district court

order amending the

sentence only notes that “no I.C.R. 35 motion has been ﬁled by counsel.” (46774 R., p.
56.)

Nothing

“consider”

its

in the record states that the district court did or did not read the letter or

contents in deciding to reduce the sentence on

10

its

own motion.

Finally,

discretion

even

if the district court

by not “consider[ing]”

had read the

the information

letter, it

would not have abused

Shunn claims

it

its

should have considered

because review 0f the record shows that information was not relevant to any reduction of
sentence.

At

the sentencing the district court asked

Shunn

(TL, p. 31, L. 2.)

stated that he

Shunn about

his “current medications.”

was taking an anti-schizophrenic (Geodon 0r

Ziprasidone), an anti-depressant (Effexor or Venlafaxine), and “they were trying to add

Haldol,” an anti-psychotic. (T12, p. 31, Ls. 3-6.) The court asked where Shunn was being
treated before going into custody

been seeing. (TL,

“on

[his]

crime.

p. 31, Ls. 7-12.)

medications

when

[he]

and he named the two mental health providers he had

The

district court

then asked whether Shunn had been

committed” the new possession 0f methamphetamine

(TL, p. 31, Ls. 13-15.) Shunn answered, “N0,” that he “stopped just right at that

time” because the “side effect knocks you out.”

(Tr., p. 31, Ls.

16-20.)

discontinuing taking his medication, however, but he “just didn’t take

meth.” (TL,
stated

it

p. 31, Ls. 21-23.)

Later, as the district court

(TL, p. 33, Ls. 13-15.)

Shunn

stated, “It

when

was pronouncing

could not “rationalize” Shunn’s decision to “discontinue

medications.”

it

was

He

[his]

just for that

denied

[he]

used

sentence,

it

mental health

moment,

sir.”

(TL, p. 33, Ls. 16-17.)
In his letter

attending

last

Shunn

asserted that he

was making

positive changes in his life such as

AA and church, wanted to treat his mental health issues,

chance and the rider t0 prove I’m serious about change!

in the letter

he claimed that when,

at sentencing,

!”

and “[begged] for one

(46674 R., pp. 51-52.) Also

he talked about stopping taking his

medications he was actually referring t0 a pain medication for a pinched nerve that he quit

11

taking for fear

it

would

interact with his psychiatric medication

quit taking his psychiatric medications,

and he would “not ever”

which he needed “now more than ever.” (46674

R., pp. 51-52.)

It is

quite clear

from the

transcript that

Shunn represented

to the district court that

he did not take his psychiatric medications When he was using methamphetamine because

he knew, apparently through experience, that
to claim that

not

by not

that

district court

showed

his sentence t0

did not abuse

treating the letter as a

its

be excessive.

discretion.

failed to

sentencing was

show that

its

by the

did not abuse

did not abuse

its

its

discretion

discretion if

failed t0

show

it

that

that the district court

sua sponte reduction 0f the sentences. Finally,

his claim that

he meant something other than What he said

“new information” meriting

reduction awarded

it

it

was no Rule 35 motion pending

would have supported. Third, Shunn has

did not consider the letter in relation to

Shunn has

First,

Rule 35 motion. Second,

did not consider the letter as evidence, because there
the evidence

causes side-effects. His attempt

he meant t0 convey something almost entirely different from what he said was

“new information”
The

this practice

at

a greater reduction in sentence than the

district court.

CONCLUSION
The

Court t0 afﬁrm the

state respectfully requests this

district court’s

reducing Shunn’s sentence.

DATED this 28th day of January, 2020.

/s/

Kenneth K. Jorgensen

KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
Deputy Attorney General
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order

CERTEICATE OF SERVICE

HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 28th day of January, 2020, served a true and
correct copy 0f the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT to the attorney listed below by
I

means of iCourt

File

and Serve:

ANDREA W. REYNOLDS
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
documents@sapd.state.id.us

/s/

Kenneth K. Jorgensen

KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
Deputy Attorney General

KKJ/dd
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